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Abstract: Ensuring energy eﬃciency, data reliability, and security is important in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). A
combination of variants from the cryptographic secret sharing technique and the disjoint multipath routing scheme is an
eﬀective strategy to address these requirements. Although Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) provides the desired reliability
and information-theoretic security, it is not energy eﬃcient. Alternatively, Shamir’s ramp secret sharing (SRSS) provides
energy eﬃciency and data reliability, but is only computationally secure. We argue that both these approaches may suﬀer
from a compromised node (CN) attack when a minimum number of nodes is compromised. Hence, we propose a new
scheme that is energy eﬃcient, provides data reliability, and is secure against CN attacks. The core idea of our scheme
is to combine SRSS and a round-reduced AES cipher, which we call “split hop AES (SHAES)”. Both the simulation
results and the theoretical analysis are employed to validate the near-sink CN attack, and a secure reliable scheme using
SHAES is proposed.
Key words: Wireless sensor networks, secret sharing, AES, semantic security, energy eﬃciency

1. Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSN) applications are becoming ubiquitous in this era of highly networked life. With
advances in technology, today’s sensor nodes can gather and process more data, leading to the creation of
new applications in recent years. To achieve cost eﬀectiveness, sensor nodes are not typically equipped with
tamper-proof facilities [1–13]. Due to their hostile and unattended environment, there is a very high chance
of nodes being compromised in a WSN. A compromised node (CN) attack is an attack in which an adversary
compromises a certain subset of nodes to passively intercept data packets traversing the compromised nodes
[8,9].
Through simulations, this paper validates the vulnerability of secret sharing schemes under the relaxation
of a secure area around the BS. We propose a new way of combining the energy-eﬃcient Shamir’s ramp secret
sharing (SRSS) method with round-reduced AES symmetric encryption, termed as ‘split hop AES (SHAES)’,
to address the CN attack problem. This paper theoretically analyzes the energy eﬃciency and security of the
proposed approach, and shows that the proposed combination achieves both semantic security and reliability
in an energy-eﬃcient way.
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1.1. Related work
In the literature, there are various contributions towards security in WSNs. [1] proposes an authenticated group
key agreement (AGKA) protocol, and demonstrates how it can tackle node replication and Sybil attacks. In
our proposed method, we concentrate on reliability and security by using encryption techniques. [2] discusses
eﬃcient and secure routing protocol based on encryption and authentication. This method involves encryption
of all communicated packets. In our proposed method, the data are divided into shares and routed via diﬀerent
paths. At the BS, they converge using Lagrange’s interpolation method. We do not encrypt all the shares; the
details of the encryption method can be found in Section 2.1. A few similar security management methods can
be found in [3], which is based on trust-based management [4], signcryption [5], key predistribution scheme, and
so on.
In [6], reliability is achieved through retransmissions. [7] proposes a routing scheme called reliability and
multipath encounter routing (RMER), to achieve reliability and energy eﬃciency. In our proposed approach, we
use Shamir’s threshold scheme to achieve the same. With the proposed approach we can achieve both reliability
and security. The details of the method can be found in Section 1.2.
The first major contributions to the secure reliable data collection of sensor networks started with HSPREAD in [8], which used Samir’s secret sharing (SSS) scheme to generate multiple shares of the data.
Additionally, a hybrid multipath scheme was used to route the shares. However, the achieved security was
low, because fixed multipaths were used to send the data. In addition, the presence of an adversary near
the BS was not considered in their approach. The work in [9] addresses the shortcomings of H-SPREAD by
using the randomized and highly dispersive nature of routing. This approach increased security compared to
H-SPREAD with the help of random dispersion. Network lifetime and security were jointly considered in [10]
with a combination of randomized and deterministic multipath routing; however, the approach was very specific
to one particular type of deployment strategy, i.e. nodes (circular) and the BS (center of the network area)
deployment.
The objective of [11] was to achieve fault tolerance with the help of the secure and eﬃcient disjoint
multipath routing strategy. The authors used data duplication and the information dispersal algorithm (IDA)
to create multiple data for routing. Similarly, this work assumed the perimeter area around the BS to always
be secure. None of the previous approaches considered the possibility of adversaries being near the BS, which
is the prime location for obtaining maximum information from the complete network area. If an adversary
compromises enough nodes to obtain the threshold shares, then security is lost.
The work in [15] addresses securing the data from aggregator node compromise, making use of secret
sharing and multipath routing. In [16], the challenges in the security design of sensor networks are explored.
The notion of semantic security in the area of sensor networks was used in their secure network encryption
protocol (SNEP) design. Additionally, the authors emphasized that their first choice was the use of the AES
block cipher algorithm; however, due to constraints in sensor node memory at that time, they opted for the RC5
algorithm. The need for semantic security in sensor networks to avoid information leakage via eavesdropping
has been reported in [17]. The work in [18] considers an ideal linear multisecret sharing (SRSS) scheme in
order to provide secure and energy eﬃcient group communications in wireless mesh networks. This approach
enhanced energy eﬃciency, but could not overcome the CN attack problem.
A brief consolidated comparison of the previous works that relate to our proposed core objective is
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of existing works.

Secure and
reliable
approaches

Core objective

Assumptions of
secure area
around BS

Type of
secret
sharing used

Encryption
used

Security achieved

[ 9]

Secure data
collection

Yes

SSS

No

Medium (CN attack is
possible and random
dispersion of shares)

[ 10]

Secure and energyefficient reliable
data collection

Yes

SSS

No

Medium (CN attack is
possible and random
dispersion of shares)

[ 14]

Secure and reliable
data collection

Explicitly not
mentioned

SSS

No

Low (CN attack is
possible and no random
dispersion of shares)

[ 18]

Secure group
communications

Explicitly not
mentioned

SRSS

No

Low (CN attack is
possible with lesser
number of shares(SRSS))

Our approach

Secure and energy efficient reliable
data collection

No

SRSS

No

High (achieves semantic
security and CN attack is
not possible)

The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 presents an overview of SSS, Section 1.4 discusses
the near sink CN attack, and Section 1.5 discusses the SHAES scheme.
Section 2 presents the details of the proposed work, which explains a combination of the SRSS and
SHAES schemes, security analysis, energy eﬃciency, and reliability analysis. Section 2.4 concludes the paper.
1.2. Overview of secret sharing schemes
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing (SSS) scheme splits the secret data into n shares [7]. Of these n shares,
only t shares are required to reconstruct the complete original data. Any t – 1 shares reveal no information
about the message. This desirable property of the SSS scheme helps to generate the data redundancy required
to achieve reliability, while still providing information-theoretic security. Share generation is quite simple and
is obtained by evaluating the polynomial of degree t – 1 under a Galois field (GF), given by Eq. (1) [20].
S =
where

(
)
∑t − 1
a0 +
ai xi #,
i=1

(1)

a0 & are the secret data.
ai & are the random data.
S & is the shares generated for each value ofx.

Reconstruction of shares can be achieved by Lagrange’s interpolation method as explained by [20], and is
achieved at the BS, which is not usually constrained by resources. To achieve information-theoretic security,
the data coeﬃcients are used only at the a 0 position. This leads to an increase in the required communications
to convey the overall data. To reduce the overall communications and, therefore, reduce excessive energy drain,
SRSS (t 1 , t 2 , n), as explained in [20], can be used in WSNs. SRSS allows more data to be used in the polynomial
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computations of S given by Eq. (1), by replacing t with t 2 . The first t 0 values of Eq. (1) are obtained from
the secret data, and the remaining t 1 (t 1 = (t 2 – t 0 )) values are obtained from the random data. Thus, no
information about the message is leaked until an adversary can access the t 1 shares. If an adversary has t 1 +
1 shares or more, then information leakage begins and increases until it reaches t 2 shares, where the complete
information is obtained [20].

1.3. Assumptions
Sensor nodes are not equipped with tamper-proof facilities. They are prone to be compromised by an adversary,
and can perform SRSS and SHAES operations having unique 128-bit keys. The BS is always secure with
unlimited energy and processing power, and has complete knowledge of the unique 128-bit key associated with
each node. Compared to previous related works, the assumption of the secure area around the BS is relaxed in
our approach.

1.4. Near-sink CN attack
The security of SSS lies in the divergence of the shares from the adversary. If the threshold shares converge
near the adversary, then secret sharing schemes cannot provide any security. In sensor networks, all the data
need to be collected at the BS; therefore, all shares need to converge at the BS. If the adversary compromises
a few nodes near the BS, then it can attempt to obtain the shares required to reconstruct the complete data.
We term this type of attack as a near-sink CN attack. The near-sink CN attack can compromise the security
achieved by SSSs used in WSN applications. To validate the near-sink CN attack, two deployment strategies
are considered: centralized sink deployment, where the BS is located at the center of the random nodes, and
corner sink deployment, where the BS is located in the corner of the network area containing randomly deployed
nodes. A single node is assumed to be compromised by the adversary near the BS. To study the eﬀect of a
near-sink CN attack with respect to its distance from the BS, the compromised node is located at diﬀerent
distances from the BS. The transmission power level and communication channel path loss model determine
the range and successful reception of data. The near-sink CN attack is tested with diﬀerent transmission power
levels: 0, –1, –3, and –5 dBm. The channel is characterized by the log-normal path loss model, having a path
loss exponent of η = 2.4, with slow fading characterized by diﬀerent standard deviation σ values of 0, 1, 3, and
5 in db. Simulations are carried out in Castalia 3.2, a discrete network simulator with nodes near the BS, which
communicates the shares to the BS and has a receiver sensitivity of –95 dBm. Castalia is an open network
simulator meant for WSNs and body area networks based on the OMNeT ++ platform. Our simulations were
conducted on a network area of 100 × 100 m with 100 randomly deployed nodes. Figure 1a clarifies that under
the centralized BS scenario, the circumference area around the BS with a radius of 20 m can overhear 80% of
the shares under all transmission power levels. With a transmission power level of 0 dBm, a compromised node
can overhear 75% of shares in the perimeter area around the BS with a radius of 45 m. Therefore, a near-sink
CN attack is a prominent attack in the applications of WSNs that use secret sharing schemes. When the BS
is deployed to any of its network corners, the area around the BS is smaller. Therefore, shares converge well
before they reach the BS. Figure 1b justifies that at the 0 dBm power level, a compromised node that is 50 m
away from the BS can overhear as much as 90% of shares received by the BS. Although the security achieved
by the SSS is higher than the SRSS, energy eﬃciency is not achieved. Thus, we can conclude that SSSs alone
cannot provide adequate security. One way to address this attack is to encrypt the shares. Therefore, in this
work we consider reduced AES symmetric encryption, termed as SHAES, to encrypt the shares.
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near sink CN attack analysis for corner deployment scenario
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Figure 1. Near-sink CN attack under diﬀerent power levels: a) centralized sink deployment, b) corner sink deployment.

1.5. Split hop AES scheme
The SHAES scheme is a reduced round version of AES with 3 full rounds and with the mix columns (MC)
omitted in the last round. The initial AddRoundKey (AK) is retained and acts as the key whitening. From the
key schedule, we require only 5 round keys to be generated for use in the AK step. We use a separate name
for this round-reduced version of AES: SHAES. Since sensor networks use multihop communication, ‘hop’ is
used. Rather than using complete AES, we split it into reduced rounds of 4; hence the term ‘split’ is used.
This encryption is used in a somewhat diﬀerent manner than the normal AES and in combination with secret
sharing. The consolidated cryptanalysis attack and its complexity (presented in the literature of 4 round AES)
is presented in tabular form in Table 2.
Table 2. Consolidated cryptanalysis attack complexity on four-round AES.

Work

Adversary type

Attack type

[19]

Highly resource bounded in data

Diﬀ and MiTm

Highly resource bounded in data

Diﬀerential

Moderately resource bounded in data

Diﬀerential

Moderately resource bounded in data
Moderately resource bounded in data

Square
Square

[21]
[22]

Data
complexity
2 CP
4 CP
12 CP
30 CP
211 CP
214.4 CP
29
29 CP

Time
complexity
280
232
255
254
252
251
28
29

2. Proposed work
2.1. SRSS and SHAES combination
The combination of SRSS with encryption is one possible way to overcome the near-sink CN attack. Properly
grouping shares and then encrypting them can provide both reliability and security. Figure 2 shows the accurate
way of combining the SRSS scheme with the SHAES encryption. Sensor nodes can select proper values for t 1 ,
t 2 , and n based on the application requirements, and can generate the shares. The shares are grouped based
on the share numbers, as shown in Figure 2. Only n – t 1 grouped shares are encrypted. Since an adversary
with only t 1 unencrypted shares cannot learn any information about the secret data, we encrypt the remaining
shares [20]. The combination scheme provides a resilience of n – t 2 share losses. Since only t 2 shares are
142

PUNEETH et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

required to reconstruct the transmitted data, the BS performs the operations shown in Figure 3 to obtain the
original data. If the shares are encrypted, then they are decrypted, and, finally, using interpolation, the data
are recovered. All the operations are performed under GF (2 8 ) .
Message Data

01010101 ………………………………………………………………… 0
............ ........................
8 bit
t 0 message
data
t 1 random data
&
Xi Used for
share generation

Secret sharing (t 1 t 2,n)

8 bit

8 bit

8 bit

Share 1

Share 2

Share 3

Share n

Share 1

Share 2

Share 3

Share n

.....

.....

.....

.....

128 bit

8 bit

Share 1

Share 2

Share 3

Share n

SHAES
encryption

SHAES
encryption

SHAES
encryption

E(Share 1)

E(Share 2)

E(Share 3)

E(Share n)

128 bit
Decrypting only n – t 1 shares

Figure 2. Graphical representation of achieving the secret sharing and SHAES combination.

2.2. SRSS + SHAES security analysis
The definition for probabilistic public-key encryption is provided in [20]. If we extend the same definition to
probabilistic symmetric encryption, it would be as follows. Probabilistic symmetric encryption can be defined
as six tuples (P, C, K, E, D, R), where P is the plaintext set space, C is the set of cipher text space, K represents
the set of key space, R is the set of randomizer space, and for each key k ∈ K, e k ∈ E is the encryption rule
and d k ∈ D is the decryption rule. The following properties should be satisfied:
1. For each e k : (P, R) → C and d k : C → P are functions such that d k (e k (p, r)) = p for every plaintext
p ∈ P and r ∈ R. This implies that e k (p, r) ̸= e k (p 1 , r), if p ̸= p 1 .
2. For any fixed k ∈ K and for any p ∈ P, define a probability distribution f (k, p) (y) on C, where f (k, p) (y)
denotes the probability that y is the cipher text, given that k is the key and p is the plaintext (probability
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E(Share 1)

E(Share 2)

E(Share 3)

E(Share n)

SHAES
decryption

SHAES
decryption

SHAES
decryption

8 bit

8 bit

8 bit

8 bit

Share 1

Share 2

Share 3

Share n

Share 1

Share 2

Share 3

Share n

128 bit

.....

Share 2

.....

Share 1

.....

.....

128 bit

Share n

Share 3
Only t2
Shares are
needed

Interpolation

Xi Used for share
generation

Message Data

01010101 ………………………………………………………………… 0
............ ........................
8 bit
Decrypting only n – t 1 shares

Figure 3. Graphical representation of retrieving the original message from the secret sharing and SHAES combination
at the BS.

should be computed on all random choices of r ∈ R). Suppose that p, p 1 ∈ P, p ̸= p 1 , and k ∈ K. The
probability distributions f (k,p) and f (k,p1) are not δ distinguishable in polynomial time. If δ is a specified
security parameter, then this is how the security of the scheme is defined.
Property 2 states that cipher texts encrypting any two plaintexts should be indistinguishable in polynomial
time. This is a desired feature for any security system and provides strong semantic security or message
indistinguishability (often used interchangeably). Any block cipher permutation function needs to be bijection
(i.e. one-to-one and onto). AES is a block cipher, and for any k ∈ K, e k (), the encryption function is also
bijection. Therefore, Property 1 is satisfied. The SRSS + SHAES combination achieves semantic security and
comes under probabilistic symmetric encryption. If the adversary using a CN attack or a near-sink CN attack
overhears the transmitted message, then they cannot learn any information from the t 1 unencrypted shares,
and, therefore, cannot reconstruct the original data. The adversary needs to successfully decrypt the encrypted
shares to know the information about the data. Since the SRSS + SHAES combination provides semantic
security, the adversary does not learn any new information from the encrypted shares and, therefore, will be
unsuccessful in decrypting the shares. Thus, the proposed optimized SRSS + SHAES combination overcomes
the CN attack problem in WSNs.
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2.3. Energy eﬃciency and reliability analysis of SRSS + SHAES
Data redundancy is necessary to achieve reliability. Therefore, as the data size and redundancy increases,
communication energy drain increases. The objective is to achieve reliability with a minimum increase in data
size. Figure 4a shows the percentage increase in data size for 1024 bits of data using SRSS and SSS schemes in
order to meet various reliability requirements indicated by n − t 2 . For instance, to aﬀord to lose 7 shares (i.e.
n − t 2 = 7) while the SRSS scheme with t 0 = 8 presents a 100% increase in data size, the SSS scheme with
t 0 = 1 would have an 800% increase in data size.

Multiplication operations for data size of 1024 bits using different schemes
800
700
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300
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100
0

8
6
4
2
8

7

6

5

4

3
t0

2

1

0

Number of operations

Percentage (%) increase in data size

Communication overhead to achieve reliability in case of 1024 bits data size

110.000
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n−t2

2

only SSStimized

3

4

SSS+SHAES

5

t2

6

SSS+AES

7

8

9

10

SS+SHAES optimized

Figure 4. a) Communication and reliability analysis of SRSS + SHAES. b) Computational overhead analysis in terms
of number of multiplication operations for diﬀerent approaches.

Note that SRSS with t 0 = 1 is the same as the SSS scheme. Furthermore, reliability requirements depend
on the wireless channel properties and, therefore, vary based on the channel conditions. Computation energy
depends on the complexity of the schemes, hardware implementation, and the processor. One general way to
analyze computation overhead is to analyze the complexity of the schemes by calculating the number of complex
operations. Major complex operations involved in SRSS and SHAES are addition and multiplication operations
under GF (2 8 ). Among these multiplication operations are the most computationally expensive operations
[20]. In AES, the MC involves multiplication operations. Addition operations are involved in AK, MC, and
key schedule. The number of addition and multiplication operations required to realize AES is calculated
to be 752 and 576, respectively. Referring to AES, the number of addition and multiplication operations
needed to realize SHAES is equal to 272 and 192, respectively. Furthermore, the polynomial evaluation of
SRSSs involves addition, multiplication, and exponential operations. Figure 4b shows the total number of
multiplication operations needed to realize the combination of SSS with AES and SHAES, encrypting each
group of shares. The exponential operations can be realized with repeated multiplication operations. The
number of multiplication and addition operations needed to communicate the data size of D‘ bytes using SRSS
are given by Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively. Figures 4b and 5a show the multiplication operations needed to
communicate the data size of 1024 bits using the SSS and SRSS schemes, respectively. For instance, at SSS (t 2
= 5, n = 5) and SSS (t 2 = 10, n = 10), the numbers of multiplication operations needed are 6400 and 57,600,
respectively. At SRSS (t 0 = 4, t 2 = 5, n = 5) and SRSS (t 0 = 8, t 2 = 10, n = 10), the number of multiplication
operations needed are 1600 and 7200, respectively. As t 2 increases, the number of multiplication operations
increases, as indicated in Figures 4b and 5a. Therefore, to reduce the computation burden under secret-sharing
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schemes, one needs to select parameters with a lower t 2 , resulting in fewer multiplication operations.
D
t0

D
t0

×n×

t2
∑

(2)

i#

i=1

× n × (t2 −1)#

(3)

The proposed optimized SRSS and SHAES combination encrypts a minimum group of shares (total size = 128
bits), as explained in Figure 2. If the encrypting share group size is less than 128 bits, then extra bits must be
added. As operations are performed in GF (2 8 ) , each share will consist of 8 bits. A group of 16 shares would
be equal to the required 128 bits. Therefore, a proper selection of SRSS parameters, based on the data size
lengths, helps to reduce the extra bits and achieves better communication energy eﬃciency. Figure 5b shows the
number of polynomial evaluations for diﬀerent data sizes using various SRSS parameters. The SRSS parameter
combinations for diﬀerent data sizes in the lower half of the demarcated line of Figure 5b are not eﬃcient,
as they require extra bits to make the share group size reach 128 bits. Since SRSS analysis in this paper is
restricted up to t 0 = 8, the lowest data size that results in an eﬃcient combination using t 0 = 8 is equal to
1024 bits. Therefore, the results of 1024-bit data size are presented in this paper. The number of multiplication
operations needed to realize the combination of SRSS with AES and SHAES encrypting each group of shares
are shown in Figures 5c and 5d, respectively. For instance, at SRSS [(t 0 = 4, t 2 = 5, n = 5) and (t 0 = 8,
t 2 =10, n = 10)], the number of multiplication operations needed for SRSS + SHAES and SRSS + AES are
[3520 and 9120] and [7360 and 12,960], respectively. The combination of SSS + SHAES with minimum share
group encryption has high computational and communication overheads. The proposed optimized combination
of SRSS + SHAES achieves low computational and communication overheads, as explained in Figures 6a and
6b. For instance, at SRSS [(t 0 = 4, t 2 = 5, n = 5) and (t 0 = 8, t 2 = 10, n = 10)] the number of multiplication
operations needed for optimized SRSS + SHAES is [3136 and 8736]. From these results, we can conclude
that the proposed optimized SRSS + SHAES with minimum share group encryption is highly energy-eﬃcient
compared to other combinations. Computational overhead is analyzed using the numbers of multiplication
operations. The diﬀerent approaches are given diﬀerent levels of computational overhead, ranging from lowest
to highest, based on the overall trend observed with the increase in t 2 and data size. Consolidated analysis of
diﬀerent objectives is presented in tabular form in Table 3.
Table 3. Consolidated analysis of diﬀerent approaches.

Works

Previous works [8–10,18]

Diﬀerent approaches examined
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Objective

CN
attack

Only SSS
Only SRSS
SSS + AES
SSS + SHAES
SRSS + AES
SRSS + SHAES
SSS + AES optimized
SRSS + SHAES optimized

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No

Computation
overhead in
terms of (x)
operations
Medium
Lowest
Highest
High
High
Medium
High
Low

Communication
overhead
in terms of
data size
High
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
Low
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polynomial evaluations for different data sizes using Secret sharing
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Figure 5. a) Computational overhead analysis in terms of multiplication operations using only SRSS. b) Polynomial
evaluations for diﬀerent data sizes using various SRSS parameters. c) Computational overhead analysis in terms of
number of multiplication operations using SRSS + AES. d) Computational overhead analysis in terms of number of
multiplication operations using optimized SRSS + SHAES.
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Figure 6. a) Computational overhead analysis in terms of number of multiplication operations using SRSS + SHAES.
b) Communication overhead analysis in terms of data size expansion using SSS and SRSS scheme.

3. Conclusion
In this paper, the vulnerability of secret sharing schemes under the relaxation of a completely secure area around
the BS to near-sink CN attacks was validated through simulation results. Simulations were carried out using
MATLAB and Castalia, a discrete network simulator. The theoretical analysis validated the achieved energy
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eﬃciency and desired semantic security. The proposed combination works independently from the underlying
routing schemes. Therefore, it can be easily incorporated into existing related works in secure data collection
of WSNs.
The following could be considered for future work in the area. Proposing an energy-eﬃcient data
reconstruction scheme for secret sharing optimized selection on the ramp secret sharing parameters, based
on the sensor network routing constraints and cryptanalysis of the proposed probabilistic symmetric encryption
scheme.
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